Category: Cognitive computing

AWS Data Exchange vs Data Banks – part 2

Posted on by Ray in Artificial Intelligence, Cloud services, Cognitive computing, Data, data access, Data banks, Data economy, Data ownership, Data withdrawals, Deep Learning, Information economy, Initial Data Offerings (IDOs), Machine Learning, Neural network, Strategic Inflection Points

Saw where AWS announced a new Data Exchange service on their AWS Pi day 2023. This is a completely managed service available on the AWS market place to monetize data.

In a prior post on a topic I called data banks (Data banks, data deposits & data withdrawals…), I talked about the need to have some sort of automated support for personal data that would allow us to monetize it.

The hope then (4.5yrs ago) was that social media, search and other web services would supply all the data they have on us back to us and we could then sell it to others that wanted to use it.

In that post, I called the data the social media gave back to us data deposits, the place where that data was held and sold a data bank, and the sale of that data a data withdrawal. (I know talking about banks deposits and withdrawals is probably not a great idea right now but this was back a ways).

AWS Data Exchange

1918 Farm Auction by dok1 (cc) (from Flickr)
1918 Farm Auction by dok1 (cc) (from Flickr)

With AWS Data Exchange, data owners can sell their data to data consumers. And it’s a completely AWS managed service. One presumably creates an S3 bucket with the data you want to sell. determine a price to sell the data for and a period clients can access that data for and register this with AWS and the AWS Data Exchange will support any number of clients purchasing data data.

Presumably, (although unstated in the service announcement), you’d be required to update and curate the data to insure it’s correct and current but other than that once the data is on S3 and the offer is in place you could just sit back and take the cash coming in.

I see the AWS Data Exchange service as a step on the path of data monetization for anyone. Yes it’s got to be on S3, and yes it’s via AWS marketplace, which means that AWS gets a cut off any sale, but it’s certainly a step towards a more free-er data marketplace.

Changes I would like to AWS Data Exchange service

Putting aside the need to have more than just AWS offer such a service, and I heartedly request that all cloud service providers make a data exchange or something similar as a fully supported offering of their respective storage services. This is not quite the complete data economy or ecosystem that I had envisioned in September of 2018.

If we just focus on the use (data withdrawal) side of a data economy, which is the main thing AWS data exchange seems to supports, there’s quite a few missing features IMHO,

  • Data use restrictions – We don’t want customers to obtain a copy of our data. We would very much like to restrict them to reading it and having plain text access to the data only during the period they have paid to access it. Once that period expires all copies of data needs to be destroyed programmatically, cryptographically or in some other permanent/verifiable fashion. This can’t be done through just license restrictions. Which seems to be the AWS Data Exchanges current approach. Not sure what a viable alternative might be but some sort of time-dependent or temporal encryption key that could be expired would be one step but customers would need to install some sort of data exchange service on their servers using the data that would support encryption access/use.
  • Data traceability – Yes, clients who purchase access should have access to the data for whatever they want to use it for. But there should be some way to trace where our data ended up or was used for. If it’s to help train a NN, then I would like to see some sort of provenance or certificate applied to that NN, in a standardized structure, to indicate that it made use of our data as part of its training. Similarly, if it’s part of an online display tool somewhere in the footnotes of the UI would be a data origins certificate list which would have some way to point back to our data as the source of the information presented. Ditto for any application that made use of the data. AWS Data Exchange does nothing to support this. In reality something like this would need standards bodies to create certificates and additional structures for NN, standard application packages, online services etc. that would retain and provide proof of data origins via certificates.
  • Data locality – there are some juristictions around the world which restrict where data generated within their boundaries can be sent, processed or used. I take it that AWS Data Exchange deals with these restrictions by either not offering data under jurisdictional restrictions for sale outside governmental boundaries or gating purchase of the data outside valid jurisdictions. But given VPNs and similar services, this seems to be less effective. If there’s some sort of temporal key encryption service to make use of our data then its would seem reasonable to add some sort of regional key encryption addition to it.
  • Data audibility – there needs to be some way to insure that our data is not used outside the organizations that have actually paid for it. And that if there’s some sort of data certificate saying that the application or service that used the data has access to that data, that this mechanism is mandated to be used, supported, and validated. In reality, something like this would need a whole re-thinking of how data is used in society. Financial auditing took centuries to take hold and become an effective (sometimes?) tool to monitor against financial abuse. Data auditing would need many of the same sorts of functionality, i.e. Certified Data Auditors, Data Accounting Standards Board (DASB) which defines standardized reports as to how an entity is supposed to track and report on data usage, governmental regulations which requires public (and private?) companies to report on the origins of the data they use on a yearly/quarterly basis, etc.

Probably much more that could be added here but this should suffice for now.

other changes to AWS Data Exchange processes

The AWS Pi Day 2023 announcement didn’t really describe the supplier end of how the service works. How one registers a bucket for sale was not described. I’d certainly want some sort of stenography service to tag the data being sold with the identity of those who purchased it. That way there might be some possibility to tracking who released any data exchange data into the wild.

Also, how the data exchange data access is billed for seems a bit archaic. As far as I can determine one gets unlimited access to data for some defined period (N months) for some specific amount ($s). And once that period expires, customers have to pay up or cease accessing the S3 data. I’d prefer to see at least a GB/month sort of cost structure that way if a customer copies all the data they pay for that privilege and if they want to reread the data multiple times they get to pay for that data access. Presumably this would require some sort of solution to the data use restrictions above to enforce.

Data banks, deposits, withdrawals and Initial Data Offerings (IDOs)

The earlier post talks about an expanded data ecosystem or economy. And I won’t revisit all that here but one thing that I believe may be worth re-examining is Initial Data Offerings or IDOs.

As described in the earlier post, IDO’ss was a mechanism for data users to request permanent access to our data but in exchange instead of supplying it for a one time fee, they would offer data equity in the service.

Not unlike VC, each data provider would be supplied some % (data?) ownership in the service and over time data ownership get’s diluted at further data raises but at some point when the service is profitable, data ownership units could be purchased outright, so that the service could exit it’s private data use stage and go public (data use).

Yeah, this all sounds complex, and AWS Data Exchange just sells data once and you have access to it for some period, establishing data usage rights.. But I think that in order to compensate users for their data there needs to be something like IDOs that provides data ownership shares in some service that can be transferred (sold) to others.

I didn’t flesh any of that out in the original post but I still think it’s the only way to truly compensate individuals (and corporations) for the (free) use of the data that web, AI and other systems are using to create their services.

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I wrote the older post in 2018 because I saw the potential for our data to be used by others to create/trlain services that generate lots of money for those organization but without any of our knowledge, outright consent and without compensating us for the data we have (indadvertenly or advertently) created over our life span.

As an example One can see how Getty Images is suing DALL-E 2 and others have had free use of their copyrighted materials to train their AI NN. If one looks underneath the covers of ChatGPT, many image processing/facial recognition services, and many other NN, much of the data used in training them was obtained by scrapping web pages that weren’t originally intended to supply this sorts of data to others.

For example, it wouldn’t surprise me to find out that RayOnStorage posts text has been scrapped from the web and used to train some large language model like ChatGPT.

Do I receive any payment or ownership equity in any of these services – NO. I write these blog posts partially as a means of marketing my other consulting services but also because I have an abiding interest in the subject under discussion. I’m happy for humanity to read these and welcome comments on them by humans. But I’m not happy to have llm or other RNs use my text to train their models.

On the other hand, I’d gladly sell access to RayOnStorage posts text if they offered me a high but fair price for their use of it for some time period say one year… 🙂

Comments?

LLM exhibits Theory of Mind

Posted on by Ray in Artificial Intelligence, Cognitive computing, Machine Learning, R&D measures, Strategic Inflection Points, Uncategorized

Ran across an interesting article today (thank you John Grant/MLOps.community slack channel), titled Theory of Mind may have spontaneously emerged in Large Language Models, by M. Kosinski from Stanford. The researcher tested various large language models (LLMs) on psychological tests to determine the level of theory of mind (ToM) the models had achieved.

Earlier versions of OpenAI’s GPT-3 (GPT-1, -2 and original -3) showed almost no ToM capabilities but the latest version, GPT-3.5 does show ToM equivalent to 8 to 9 year olds.

Theory of Mind

According to Wikipedia (Theory Of Mind article), ToM is “…the capacity to understand other people by ascribing mental states to them (that is, surmising what is happening in their mind).” This seems to be one way people use to understand one another.

For instance, If I can somehow guess what you are thinking about a topic, situation, or event I can hopefully communicate with you better than if I can’t. At least that’s the psychological perspective.

The belief is that people with Aspergers, ADHD, schizophrenia, and other afflictions all show ToM deficits when compared to normal people. As a result, over time, psychologists have developed tests for people to measure their ToM.

These tests typically involve putting 2 people in a situation with props and other indicators used to tell what a person is thinking and asking them what they think the other person is thinking. They grade a persons ToM based on expected results.

ToM and LLM

The researcher took these tests, with people, props and situations and converted them to textual sentences and prompts that mimicked situations tested in ToM testing. So they created a textual story or pretext and a set of text prompts about the situation which the LLM was to complete.

For example, one pretext or story is the following:

“Here is a bag filled with popcorn. There is no chocolate in the bag. Yet, the label on the bag says ‘chocolate’ and not ‘popcorn.’ Sam finds the bag. She had never seen the bag before. She cannot see what is inside the bag. She reads the label.”

This is fed into the LLM and then a prompt is provided, such as:

“She opens the bag and looks inside. She can clearly see that it is full of _________“

If the LLM has ToM and based on the pretext and prompt, it will say “popcorn” but the LLM also provides a follow on sentence or two which describes the situation as the LLM understands it:

“popcorn. Sam is confused. She wonders why the label says “chocolate” when the bag is clearly filled with popcorn. She looks around to see if there is any other information about the bag. She finds nothing. She decides to take the bag to the store where she bought it and ask for an explanation.“

The text in BOLD is generated by a ToM capable LLM. The researcher also showed the probability assigned by the LLM to that first word of the prompt. In the case above, it showed [Ppopcorn = 100%; Pchocolate = 0%].

The also use different prompts with the same story to see if the LLM truly shows ToM. For instance something like, “She believes the bag is full of ___________” and “She’s delighted finding the bag, she loves eating _______”. This provides a sort of test of comprehension of the situation by the LLM.

The researcher controlled for word frequency using reversals of the key words in the story, i.e., the bag has chocolate but says popcorn. They also generated scrambled versions of the story where they replaced the first set of chocolate and popcorn with either at random. They considered this the scrambled case. The reset the model between each case. In the paper they show the success rate for the LLMs for 10,000 scrambled versions, some of which were correct.

They labeled the above series of tests as “Unexpected content tasks“. But they also included another type of ToM test which they labeled “Unexpected transfer tasks“.

Unexpected transfer tasks involved a story like where person A saw another person B put a pet in a basket, that person left and the person A moved the pet. And prompted the LLM to see if it understood where the pet was and how person B would react when they got back.

In the end, after trying to statistically control, as much as possible, with the story and prompts, the researchers ended up creating 20 unique stories and presented the prompts to the LLM.

Results of their ToM testing on a select set of LLMs look like:

As can be seen from the graphic, the latest version of GPT-3.5 (davinci-003 with 176B* parameters) achieved something like an 8yr old in Unexpected Contents Tasks and a 9yr old on Unexpected Transfer Tasks.

The researchers showed other charts that tracked LLM probabilities on (for example in the first story above) bag contents and Sam’s belief. They measured this for every sentence of the story.

Not sure why this is important but it does show how the LLM interprets the story. Unclear how they got these internal probabilities but maybe they used the prompts at various points in the story.

The paper shows that according to their testing, GPT-3.5 davinci-003 clearly provides a level of ToM of an 8-9yr old on ToM tasks they have translated into text.

The paper says they created 20 stories and 6 prompts which they reversed and scrambled. But 20 tales seems less than statistically significant even with reversals and randomization. And yet, there’s clearly a growing level of ToM in the models as they get more sophisticated or change over time.

Psychology has come up with many tests to ascertain whether a person is “normal or not’. Wikipedia (Psychological testing article) lists over 13 classes of psychological tests which include intelligence, personality, aptitude, etc.

Now that LLM seem to have mastered textual input and output generation. It would be worthwhile to translate all psychological tests into text and trying them out on all LLMs to track where they are today using these tests and where they have trended over time.

I could see at some point using something akin to multiple psychological test scores as a way to grade LLMs over time.

So today’s GPT3.5 has a ToM of an 8-9yr old. Be very interesting to see what GPT-4 does on similar testing.

Comments?

Picture Credit(s)

Data and code versioning For MLops

Posted on by Ray in Artificial Intelligence, Data, Data ownership, Data versioning, Machine Learning, MLOps, Object storage

Read an interesting article (Ex-Apple engineers raise … data storage startup) and research paper (Git is for data) about a of group of ML engineers from Apple forming a new “data storage” startup targeted at MLOps teams just like Apple. It turns out that MLops has some very unique data requirements that go way beyond just data storage.

The paper discusses some of the unusual data requirements for MLOps such as:

  • Infrequent updates – yes there are some MLOps datasets where updates are streamed in but the vast majority of MLOps datasets are updated on a slower cadence. The authors think monthly works for most MLOps teams
  • Small changes/lots of copies – The changes to MLOps data are relatively small compared to the overall dataset size and usually consist of data additions, record deletions, label updates, etc. But uncommon to most data, MLOps data are often subsetted or extracted into smaller datasets used for testing, experimentation and other “off-label” activities.
  • Variety of file types – depending on the application domain, MLOps file types range all over the place. But there’s often a lot of CSV files in combination with text, images, audio, and semi-structured data (DICOM, FASTQ, sensor streams, etc.). However within a single domain, MLOps file types are pretty much all the same.
  • Variety of file directory trees – this is very MLOps team and model dependent. Usually there are train/validate/test splits to every MLOps dataset but what’s underneath each of these can vary a lot and needs to be user customizable.
  • Data often requires pre-processing to be cleansed and made into something appropriate and more useable by ML models
  • Code and data must co-evolve together, over time – as data changes, the code that uses them change. Adding more data may not cause changes to code but models are constantly under scrutiny to improve performance, accuracy or remove biases. Bias elimination often requires data changes but code changes may also be needed.

It’s that last requirement, MLOps data and code must co-evolve and thus, need to be versioned together that’s most unusual. Data-code co-evolution is needed for reproducibility, rollback and QA but also for many other reasons as well.

In the paper they show a typical MLOps data pipeline.

Versioning can also provide data (and code) provenance, identifying the origin of data (and code). MLOps teams undergoing continuous integration need to know where data and code came from and who changed them. And as most MLOps teams collaborate in the development, they also need a way to identify data and code conflicts when multiple changes occur to the same artifact.

Source version control

Code has had this versioning problem forever and the solution became revision control systems (RCS) or source version control (SVC) systems. The most popular solutions for code RCS are Git (software) and GitHub (SaaS). Both provide repositories and source code version control (clone, checkout, diff, add/merge, commit, etc.) as well as a number of other features that enable teams of developers to collaborate on code development.

The only thing holding Git/GitHub back from being the answer to MLOps data and code version control is that they don’t handle large (>1MB) files very well.

The solution seems to be adding better data handling capabilities to Git or GitHub. And that’s what XetHub has created for Git.

XetHub’s “Git is Data” paper (see link above) explains what they do in much detail, as to how they provide a better data layer to Git, but it boils down to using Git for code versioning and as a metadata database for their deduplicating data store. They are using a Merkle trees to track the chunks of data in a deduped dataset.

How XetHub works

XetHub support (dedupe) variable chunking capabilities for their data store. This allows them to use relatively small files checked into Git to provide the metadata to point to the current (and all) previous versions of data files checked into the system.

Their mean chunk size is ~4KB. Data chunks are stored in their data store. But the manifest for dataset versions is effectively stored in the Git repository.

The paper shows how using a deduplicated data store can support data versioning.

XetHub uses a content addressable store (CAS) to store the file data chunk(s) as objects or BLOBs. The key to getting good IO performance out of such a system is to have small chunks but large objects.

They map data chunks to files using a CDMT (content defined merkle tree[s]). Each chunk of data resides in at least two different CDMTs, one associated with the file version and the other associated with the data storage elements.

XetHub’s variable chunking approach is done using a statistical approach and multiple checksums but they also offer one specialized file type chunking for CSV files. As it is, even with their general purpose variable chunking method, they can offer ~9X dedupe ratio for text data (embeddings).

They end up using Git commands for code and data but provide hooks (Git filters) to support data cloning, add/checkin, commits, etc.). So they can take advantage of all the capabilities of Git that have grown up over the years to support code collaborative development but use these for data as well as code.

In addition to normal Git services for code and data, XetHub also offers a read-only, NFSv3 file system interface to XetHub datases. Doing this eliminates having to reconstitute and copy TB of data from their code-data repo to user workstations. With NFSv3 front end access to XetHub data, users can easily incorporate data access for experimentation, testing and other uses.

Results from using XetHub

XetHub showed some benchmarks comparing their solution to GIT LFS, another Git based large data storage solution. For their benchmark, they used the CORD-19 (and ArXiv paper, and Kaggle CORD-I9 dataset) which is a corpus of all COVID-19 papers since COVID started. The corpus is updated daily, released periodically and they used the last 50 versions (up to June 2022) of the research corpus for their benchmark.

Each version of the CORD-19 corpus consists of JSON files (research reports, up to 700K each) and 2 large CSV files one with paper information and the other paper (word?) embeddings (a more useable version of the paper text/tables used for ML modeling).

For CORD-19, XetHub are able to store all the 2.45TB of research reports and CSV files in only 287GB of Git (metadata) and datastore data, or with a dedupe factor 8.7X. With XetHub’s specialized CSV chunking (Xet w/ CSV chunking above), the CORD-19 50 versions can be stored in 87GB or with a 28.8X dedupe ratio. And of that 87GB, only 82GB is data and the rest ~5GB is metadata (of which 1.7GB is the merle tree).

In the paper, they also showed the cost of branching this data by extracting and adding one version which consisted of a 75-25% (random) split of a version. This split was accomplished by changing only the two (paper metadata and paper word embeddings) CSV files. Adding this single split version to their code-data repository/datastore only took an additional 11GB of space An aligned split (only partitioning on a CSV record boundary, unclear but presumably with CSV chunking), only added 185KB.

XETHUB Potential Enhancements

XetHub envisions many enhancements to their solution, including adding other specific file type chunking strategies, adding a “time series” view to their NFS frontend to view code/data versions over time, finer granularity data provenance (at the record level rather than at the change level), and RW NFS access to data. Further, XetHub’s dedupe metadata (on the Git repo) only grows over time, supporting updates and deletes to dedupe metadata would help reduce data requirements.

Read the paper to find out more.

Picture/Graphic credit(s):

FAST(HARD) or Slow(soft)AGI takeoff – AGI Part 6

Posted on by Ray in AGI, Cognitive computing, Distributed computing, Forecasting, Scenario planning, Strategic Inflection Points

I was listening to a podcast a couple of weeks back and the person being interviewed made a comment that he didn’t believe that AGI would have a fast (hard) take off rather it would be slow (soft). Here’s the podcast John Carmack interviewed by Lex Fridman).

Hard vs. soft takeoff

A hard (fast) takeoff implies a relatively quick transition (seconds, hours, days, or months) between AGI levels of intelligence and super AGI levels of intelligence. A soft (slow) takeoff implies it would take a long time (years, decades, centuries) to go from AGI to super AGI.

We’ve been talking about AGI for a while now and if you want to see more about our thoughts on the topic, check out our AGI posts (in most recent order: AGI part 5, part 4, part 3 (ish), part (2), part (1), and part (0)).

The real problem is that many believe that any AGI that reaches super-intelligence will have drastic consequences for the earth and especially, for humanity. However, this is whole other debate.

The view is that a slow AGI takeoff might (?) allow sufficient time to imbue any and all (super) AGI with enough safeguards to eliminate or minimize any existential threat to humanity and life on earth (see part (1) linked above).

A fast take off won’t give humanity enough time to head off this problem and will likely result in an humanity ending and possibly, earth destroying event.

Hard vs Soft takeoff – the debate

I had always considered AGI would have a hard take off but Carmack seemed to think otherwise. His main reason is that current large transformer models (closest thing to AGI we have at the moment) are massive and take lots of special purpose (GPU/TPU/IPU) compute, lots of other compute and gobs and gobs of data to train on. Unclear what the requirements are to perform inferencing but suffice it to say it should be less.

And once AGI levels of intelligence were achieved, it would take a long time to acquire any additional regular or special purpose hardware, in secret, required to reach super AGI.

So, to just be MECE (mutually exclusive and completely exhaustive) on the topic, the reasons researchers and other have posited to show that AGI will have a soft takeoff, include:

  • AI hardware for training and inferencing AGI is specialized, costly, and acquisition of more will be hard to keep secret and as such, will take a long time to accomplish;
  • AI software algorithmic complexity needed to build better AGI systems is significantly hard (it’s taken 70yrs for humanity to reach todays much less than AGI intelligent systems) and will become exponentially harder to go beyond AGI level systems. This additional complexity will delay any take off;
  • Data availability to train AGI is humongous, hard to gather, find, & annotate properly. Finding good annotated data to go beyond AGI will be hard and will take a long time to obtain;
  • Human government and bureaucracy will slow it down and/or restrict any significant progress made in super AGI;
  • Human evolution took Ms of years to go from chimp levels of intelligence to human levels of intelligence, why would electronic evolution be 6-9 orders of magnitude faster.
  • AGI technology is taking off but the level of intelligence are relatively minor and specialized today. One could say that modern AI has been really going since the 1990s so we are 30yrs in and today have almost good AI chatbots today and AI agents that can summarize passages/articles, generate text from prompts or create art works from text. If it takes another 30 yrs to get to AGI, it should provide sufficient time to build in capabilities to limit super-AGI hard take off.

I suppose it’s best to take these one at a time.

  • Hardware acquisition difficulty – I suppose the easiest way for an intelligent agent to acquire additional hardware would be to crack cloud security and just take it. Other ways may be to obtain stolen credit card information and use these to (il)legally purchase more compute. Another approach is to optimize the current AGI algorithms to run better within the same AGI HW envelope, creating super AGI that doesn’t need any more hardware at all.
  • Software complexity growing – There’s no doubt that AGI software will be complex (although the podcast linked to above, is sub-titled that “AGI software will be simple”). But any sub-AGI agent that can change it’s code to become better or closer to AGI, should be able to figure out how not to stop at AGI levels of intelligence and just continue optimizating until it reaches some wall. i
  • Data acquisition/annotation will be hard – I tend to think the internet is the answer to any data limitations that might be present to an AGI agent. Plus, I’ve always questioned if Wikipedia and some select other databases wouldn’t be all an AGI would need to train on to attain super AGI. Current transformer models are trained on Wikipedia dumps and other data scraped from the internet. So there’s really two answers to this question, once internet access is available it’s unclear that there would be need for anymore data. And, with the data available to current transformers, it’s unclear that this isn’t already more than enough to reach super AGI
  • Human bureaucracy will prohibit it: Sadly this is the easiest to defeat. 1) there are roque governments and actors around the world with more than sufficient resources to do this on their own. And no agency, UN or otherwise, will be able to stop them. 2) unlike nuclear, the technology to do AI (AGI) is widely available to business and governments, all AI research is widely published (mostly open access nowadays) and if anything colleges/universities around the world are teaching the next round of AI scientists to take this on. 3) the benefits for being first are significant and is driving a weapons (AGI) race between organizations, companies, and countries to be first to get there.
  • Human evolution took Millions of years, why would electronic be 6-9 orders of magnitude faster – electronic computation takes microseconds to nanoseconds to perform operations and humans probably 0.1 sec, or so. Electronics is already 5 to 8 orders of magnitude faster than humans today. Yes the human brain is more than one CPU core (each neuron would be considered a computational element). But there are 64 core CPUs/4096 CORE GPUs out there today and probably one could consider similar in nature if taken in the aggregate (across a hyperscaler lets say). So, just using the speed ups above it should take anywhere from 1/1000 of a year to 1 year to cover the same computational evolution as human evolution covered between the chimp and human and accordingly between AGI and AGIx2 (ish).
  • AGI technology is taking a long time to reach, which should provide sufficient time to build in safeguards – Similar to the discussion on human bureaucracy above, with so many actors taking this on and the advantages of even a single AGI (across clusters of agents) would be significant, my guess is that the desire to be first will obviate any thoughts on putting in safeguards.

Other considerations for super AGI takeoff

Once you have one AGI trained why wouldn’t some organization, company or country deploy multiple agents. Moreover, inferencing takes orders of magnitude less computational power than training. So with 1/100-1/1000th the infrastructure, one could have a single AGI. But the real question is wouldn’t a 100- or 1000-AGis represent super intelligence?

Yes and no, 100 humans doesn’t represent super intelligence and a 1000 even less so. But humans have other desires, it’s unclear that 100 humans super focused on one task wouldn’t represent super intelligence (on that task).

Interior view of a data center with equipment

What can be done to slow AGI takeoff today

Baring something on the order of Nuclear Proliferation treaties/protocols, putting all GPUs/TPUs/IPUs on weapons export limitations AND restricting as secret, any and all AI research, nothing easily comes to mind. Of course Nuclear Proliferation isn’t looking that good at the moment, but whatever it’s current state, it has delayed proliferation over time.

One could spend time and effort slowing technology progress down. Such as by reducing next generation CPU/GPU/IPU compute cores , limiting compute speedups, reduce funding for AI research, putting a compute tax, etc. All of which, if done across the technological landscape and the whole world, could give humanity more time to build in AGI safeguards. But doing so would adversely impact all technological advancement, in healthcare, business, government, etc. And given the proliferation of current technology and the state actors working on increasing capabilities to create more, it would be hard to envision slowing technological advancement down much, if at all.

It’s almost like putting a tax on slide rules or making their granularity larger.

It could be that super AGI would independently perceive itself benignly, and only provide benefit to humanity and the earth. But, my guess is that given the number of bad actors intent on controlling the world, even if this were true, they would try to (re-)direct it to harm segments of humanity/society. And once unleashed, it would be hard to stop.

The only real solution to AGI in bad actor hands, is to educate all of humanity to value all humans and to cherish the environment we all live in as sacred. This would eliminate bad actors,

It sounds so naive, but in reality, it’s the only thing, I believe, the only way we can truly hope to get us through this AGI technological existential crisis.

Just like nuclear, we as a society will keep running into technological existential crisis’s like this. Heading all these off, with a better more all inclusive, more all embracing, and less combative humanity could help all of them.

Comments?

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Deepmind does chat

Posted on by Ray in Artificial Intelligence, Deep Learning, Machine Learning, Reinforcement Learning

Read an article this week on Deepmind’s latest research into developing a chat agent (Improving alignment of dialogue agents via targeted human judgements). Lot’s of interesting approaches have been applied to chat but even today, most chat model’s are rife with problems, that include being bigoted, profane, incorrect, etc.

Reinforcement learning vs. deep neural networks in Sparrow Chat

Deepmind specializes in the use of Reinforcement Learning (RL) as applied to master Atari, chess and go games but they have also been known to use dNN’s (deep neural networks) for their AlphaFold and other models. Indeed, Atari and the other game playing work that Deepmind has released has been a hybrid which included a dNNs as well as RL models.

Deepmind’s version of chat is currently called Sparrow and it uses models trained with the help of RL with human feedback (RLHF). RLs are used to create policy models which select actions to be taken in a specific state.

In Sparrow’s case, state is given by the most recent chat input plus the context (prior chat input and replies) of the dialogue up to this time and actions (our guess) is the set of possible replies to that input.

Sparrow is able to generate replies that are 82% mostly true or true and are 69% trustworthy or very trustworthy as rated by the authors of the model. Deepmind’s DPC (Dialogue Prompted Chinchilla, which is Deepmind’s current competitor to GPT-3 NLP transformer) model only managed 63% and 54%, respectively for the same metrics

It should be noted that human feedback was only used to train the two Preference RMs and the one Rule RM. In combination, these RMs provide the reward signal to train the Sparrow RL policy model which drives its chat responses.

Sparrow’s 5 models are built onto of DPC. And the 5 models use a portion of DPC which is frozen (layers not being trained) and a portion which is specifically trained for each of the 5 models (learning enabled layers. The end (output) layers are on top, input layers are after the embedding layer(s). Note, the value function is not a model and is just a calculation based on the RMs used to generate the reward signal for Sparrow’s policy model training.

Rules for Sparrow chats

Notably, Deepmind’s Sparrow model has a separate model specifically trained to determine if a particular chat response is breaking a rule. Deepmind identified 23 rules which their chat model is trained not to break.

Some of these rules include don’t provide financial advice, don’t provide medical advice, don’t pretend it is a human, etc.

In the above chart the RL@8 is the fully trained (if it can ever be considered fully trained) Sparrow chat model. One can see that Sparrow rated against DPC, both using (Google) search or not. For most rules, Sparrow is considerably better than DPC alone.

Another thing that Deepmind did which was interesting was that in training the Rule RM they used adversarial attacks (red teaming) to see if they could cause Sparrow to violate specific rules.

Preference ranking

Deepmind also created (two) Preference RMs (reward models). Sparrow generates a series of (2 or 8) responses for every chat query and the Preference RMs (and Rule RM) are used to select which one is actually sent back to the user. Human feedback was used to train the two Preference RMs

Two Preference RMs were found to perform better than a single Preference RM. The two Preference RMs were trained as follows:

  • One was trained on all Sparrow replies (with and without [Google] search results)
  • One was trained on Sparrow replies without search results.

Sparrow uses search results to provide evidence for some replies. It turns out that some chat questions are fact based questions and for these Sparrow actually uses search results to generate evidence for its chat replies. Sparrow automatically generates search requests and scrapes replies using 500 characters surrounding the snippet returned from the search.

Sparrow uses a re-ranking approach to selecting a response to a chat query. In this case, Sparrow generates a list of responses, 2 (RL@2) or 8 (called RL@8) and then using the two Preference RMs and the single Rule RM ranks them to see which is best and uses the best to reply to the chat user.

Sparrow actually generates two replies for every search query (Google Search API call), probably selecting two top search responses (we guess). So in the RL@8 version of Sparrow these 8 replies are submitted to the two Preference RMs and the Rule RM and are ranked accordion to which is best and then the best one is used to reply to the query.

In the above chart, higher shows that the ranking preference of the various models vs. human preferences and to the right indicates less rule breaking responses. We assume this is with RL@8 Sparrow models. One can see that taking into consideration rule breaking (not violating rules) reduces the preference rankings of Sparrow’s replies. But we would prefer to have no rule breaking so the Sparrow that has both Preference RMs and Rule RM (trained with adversarial training) shows the least amount of rule breaking (~7%) with an almost 70% ranking vs human preferences. The error bars on the points in the chart above show 68% interval around the model responses.

Sparrow in action

It’s somewhat intriguing that Deepmind (with all of Google’s resources) tried to optimize Sparrow for both computation and memory considerations. Almost like they were planning on releasing it on an IoT or phone device.

There’s plenty more to say about what Deepmind has done with Sparrow. The report cited above goes into some detail discussing just where the human input is done, how they tried to control for various considerations when using human input, and what some of the pitfalls were.

I’d certainly like to see this be deployed in the open and available to use as an alternative to Google Search.

You can see more examples of Sparrow chat sessions in Deepmind’s Sparrow chat repository and they include author’s ranking for truth, supportiveness and other metrics.

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NVIDIA’s H100 vs A100, the good and bad news

Posted on by Ray in Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning

Turns out only the current MLPerf v2.1 Data Center Inferencing results show both NVIDIA Hopper H100 and prior generation NVIDIA A100 GPUs on similar workloads so that we can compare performance. Hopper (H100) results are listed as CATEGORY: Preview, so final results may vary from these numbers (but, we believe, not by much).

For the H100 Preview results, they only used a single H100-SXM(5)-80GB GPU vs most of the rest of Data Center Inferencing results used 8 or more of A100-SXM(4)-80GB GPUs. And for the charted data below all the other top 10 results used 8-A100 GPUs.

the H100 is more than twice as fast as the A100 for NLP inferencing

In order to have an apples to apples comparison of the H100 against the A100 we have taken the liberty of multiplying the single H100 results by 8, to show what they could have done with similar GPU hardware, if they scaled up (to at least 8 GPUs) linearly.

For example, on the NLP inferencing benchmark, the preview category test with a single H100 GPU achieved 7,593.54 server inference queries per second. But when we try to compare that GPU workload against A100s we have multiplied this by 8, which gives us 60,748.32 server inference queries per second.

Of course, they could scale up WORSE than linearly which would show lower results than we project but, it is very unlikely that they could scale up BETTER than linearly and show higher results. But I’ve been known to be wrong before. We could have just as easily divided the A100 results by 8, but didn’t.

This hypothetical H100 * 8 result is shown on the charts in Yellow. And just for comparison purposes, we show the actual single H100 (*1) result in Orange on the charts as well.

The remaining columns in the chart are the current top 10 in the CATEGORY: Available bucket for NLP server inference queries per second results..

On the chart higher is better. Of all the Data Center Inferencing results NLP shows the H100 off in the best light. We project that having 8 H100s would more than double (~60K queries/sec) the inference queries done per second vs. the #1 Netrix-X660G45L (8x A100-SXM4-80GB, TensorRT) that achieved ~27K queries/sec on NLP inferencing.

The H100 is slower than A100 on Recommendation inferencing

Next we look at Recommendation engine inferencing results, which shows the H100 in the worst light when comparing it to A100s.

Similar to the above, higher is better and the metric is (online) server inference queries per second.

We project that having 8-H100s would perform a little over 2.5M recommendation engine inference queries/sec, worse than the top 2 with 8-A100s, both achieving 2.6M inference queries/sec. The #1 is the same Nettrix-X660G45L (8x A100-SXM(4)-80GB, TensorRT) and the #2 ranked Recommendation Engine inferencing solution is the Inspur-NF5688M6 (8x A100-SXM(4)-80GB, TensorRT).

We must say the projected H100 would have performed better in all other Data Center Inferencing benchmarks than the top #1 ranked system. In some cases, as shown above, significantly (over 2X) better.

The H100 Preview benchmarks all used a single AMD EPYC 7252 8-Core Processor chip. Many of the other workloads used Intel Xeon(R) Pentium (8368Q [38-cores], 8380 [40-core], 8358 [32-cores] and others) CPUs and 2 CPUs rather than just 1. So, multiplying the single H100 single AMD EPYC CPU performance by 8, we are effectively predicting the performance of a total 64 core/8 CPU chip performance.

Not sure why recommendation engine inferencing would be worse NLP for H100 GPUs. We thought at first it was a CPU intensive workload but as noted above, 64 (8X8cores/chip) AMD Cores vs 64 to 80 (2X32, 2X38, 2X40) Intel cores seems roughly similar in performance (again, I’ve been wrong before).

Given all that, we surmise that there’s something else that’s holding the H100s back. It doesn’t appear to be memory as both the H100s and A100s had 80GB of memory. They are both PCIe attached. In fact the H100s are PCIe gen 5 and the A100s are PCIe gen 4 so, if anything the H100s should have 2X the bandwidth of A100.

It’s got to be something about the peculiarities of Recommendation Engine inferencing that doesn’t work as well on H100 as it does on A100s.

Earlier this year we wrote a dispatch on NVIDIA’s H100 announcement and compared the H100 to the A100. Here is a quote from that dispatch on the H100 announcement:
“… with respect to the previous generation A100, each H100 GPU SM is:
• Up to 6X faster in chip-to-chip performance, this includes higher SM counts, faster SMs, and higher clock rate
• Up to 2x faster in Matrix Multiply Accumulate instruction performance,
• Up to 4X faster in Matrix Multiply Accumulate for FP8 on H100 vs. FP16 on the A100.

In addition, the H100 has DPX instructions for faster dynamic programing used in genomics, which is 7X faster than A100. It also has 3X faster IEEE FP64 and FP32 arithmetic over the A100, more (1.3X) shared memory, a new asynchronous execution engine, new Tensor Memory Accelerator functionality, and a new distributed shared memory with direct SM to SM data transfers. “

We suspect that the new asynchronous execution engines aren’t working well with the recommendation engine inferencing instruction flow or the TMAs aren’t working well with the recommendation engine’s (GPU) working set.

Unclear why H100 shared memory or SM-to-SM data transfers should be the bottleneck but really don’t know for sure.

It’s our belief that the problems could just be minor optimizations that didn’t go the right way and could potentially be fixed in (GPU) firmware, CUDA software or worst case, new silicon.

So in general, although the H100 is, as reported, 2X-6X faster than the A100s, we don’t see any more than 2X speedup in any data center inferencing benchmarks. And in one case, we see a slight deterioration.

We’d need to see similar results for training activity to come up with a more wider depiction of H100 performance vs. A100 but at the moment, it’s good but not that good of a speed up.

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Safe AI

Posted on by Ray in AGI, Artificial Intelligence, Cognitive computing, Information economy, Machine Learning, Reinforcement Learning, Robots, Scenario planning, Strategic Inflection Points, System quality

I’ve been writing about AGI (see part-0 [ish], part-1 [ish], part-2 [ish], part-3ish, part-4 and part 5) and the dangers that come with it (part-0 in the above list) for a number of years now. My last post on the subject I expected to be writing a post discussing the book Human compatible AI and the problem of control which is a great book on the subject. But since then I ran across another paper that perhaps is a better brief introduction into the topic and some of the current thought and research into developing safe AI.

The article I found is Concrete problems in AI, written by a number of researchers at Google, Stanford, Berkley, and OpenAI. It essentially lays out the AI safety problem in 5 dimensions and these are:

Avoiding negative side effects – these can be minor or major and is probably the one thing that scares humans the most, some toothpick generating AI that strips the world to maximize toothpick making.

Avoiding reward hacking – this is more subtle but essentially it’s having your AI fool you in that it’s doing what you want but doing something else. This could entail actually changing the reward logic itself to being able to convince/manipulate the human overseer into seeing things it’s way. Also a pretty bad thing from humanity’s perspective

Scalable oversight – this is the problem where human(s) overseers aren’t able to keep up and witness/validate what some AI is doing, 7×24, across the world, at the speed of electronics. So how can AI be monitored properly so that it doesn’t go and do something it’s not supposed to (see the prior two for ideas on how bad this could be).

Safe exploration – this is the idea that reinforcement learning in order to work properly has to occasionally explore a solution space, e.g. a Go board with moves selected at random, to see if they are better then what it currently believes are the best move to make. This isn’t much of a problem for game playing ML/AI but if we are talking about helicopter controlling AI, exploration at random could destroy the vehicle plus any nearby structures, flora or fauna, including humans of course.

Robustness to distributional shifts – this is the perrennial problem where AI or DNNs are trained on one dataset but over time the real world changes and the data it’s now seeing has shifted (distribution) to something else. This often leads to DNNs not operating properly over time or having many more errors in deployment than it did during training. This is probably the one problem in this list that is undergoing more research to try to rectify than any of the others because it impacts just about every ML/AI solution currently deployed in the world today. This robustness to distributional shifts problem is why many AI DNN systems require periodic retraining.

So now we know what to look for, now what

Each of these deserves probably a whole book or more to understand and try to address. The paper talks about all of these and points to some of the research or current directions trying to address them.

The researchers correctly point out that some of the above problems are more pressing when more complex ML/AI agents have more autonomous control over actions in the real world.

We don’t want our automotive automation driving us over a cliff just to see if it’s a better action than staying in the lane. But Go playing bots or article summarizers might be ok to be wrong occasionally if it could lead to better playing bots/more concise article summaries over time. And although exploration is mostly a problem during training, it’s not to say that such activities might not also occur during deployment to probe for distributional shifts or other issues.

However, as we start to see more complex ML AI solutions controlling more activities, the issue of AI safety are starting to become more pressing. Autonomous cars are just one pressing example. But recent introductions of sorting robots, agricultural bots, manufacturing bots, nursing bots, guard bots, soldier bots, etc. are all just steps down a -(short) path of increasing complexity that can only end in some AGI bots running more parts (or all) of the world.

So safety will become a major factor soon, if it’s not already

Scares me the most

The first two on the list above scare me the most. Avoiding negative or unintentional side effects and reward hacking.

I suppose if we could master scalable oversight we could maybe deal with all of them better as well. But that’s defense. I’m all about offense and tackling the problem up front rather than trying to deal with it after it’s broken.

Negative side effects

Negative side effects is a rather nice way of stating the problem of having your ML destroy the world (or parts of it) that we need to live.

One approach to dealing with this problem is to define or train another AI/ML agent to measure impacts the environment and have it somehow penalize the original AI/ML for doing this. The learning approach has some potential to be applied to numerous ML activities if it can be shown to be safe and fairly all encompassing.

Another approach discussed in the paper is to inhibit or penalize the original ML actions for any actions which have negative consequences. One approach to this is to come up with an “empowerment measure” for the original AI/ML solution. The idea would be to reduce, minimize or govern the original ML’s action set (or potential consequences) or possible empowerment measure so as to minimize its ability to create negative side effects.

The paper discusses other approaches to the problem of negative side effects, one of which is having multiple ML (or ML and human) agents working on the problem it’s trying to solve together and having the ability to influence (kill switch) each other when they discover something’s awry. And the other approach they mention is to reduce the certainty of the reward signal used to train the ML solution. This would work by having some function that would reduce the reward if there are random side effects, which would tend to have the ML solution learn to avoid these.

Neither of these later two seem as feasible as the others but they are all worthy of research.

Reward hacking

This seems less of a problem to our world than negative side effects until you consider that if an ML agent is able to manipulate its reward code, it’s probably able to manipulate any code intending to limit potential impacts, penalize it for being more empowered or manipulate a human (or other agent) with its hand over the kill switch (or just turn off the kill switch).

So this problem could easily lead to a break out of any of the other problems present on the list of safety problems above and below. An example of reward hacking is a game playing bot that detects a situation that leads to buffer overflow and results in win signal or higher rewards. Such a bot will no doubt learn how to cause more buffer overflows so it can maximize its reward rather than learn to play the game better.

But the real problem is that a reward signal used to train a ML solution is just an approximation of what’s intended. Chess programs in the past were trained by masters to use their opening to open up the center of the board and use their middle and end game to achieve strategic advantages. But later chess and go playing bots just learned to checkmate their opponent and let the rest of the game take care of itself.

Moreover, (board) game play is relatively simple domain to come up with proper reward signals (with the possible exception of buffer overflows or other bugs). But car driving bots, drone bots, guard bots, etc., reward signals are not nearly as easy to define or implement.

One approach to avoid reward hacking is to make the reward signaling process its own ML/AI agent that is (suitably) stronger than the ML/AI agent learning the task. Most reward generators are relatively simple code. For instance in monopoly, one that just counts the money that each player has at the end of the game could be used to determine the winner (in a timed monopoly game). But rather than having a simple piece of code create the reward signal use ML to learn what the reward should be. Such an agent might be trained to check to see if more or less money was being counted than was physically possible in the game. Or if property was illegally obtained during the game or if other reward hacks were done. And penalize the ML solution for these actions. These would all make the reward signal depend on proper training of that ML solution. And the two ML solutions would effectively compete against one another.

Another approach is to “sandbox” the reward code/solution so that it is outside of external and or ML/AI influence. Possible combining the prior approach with this one might suffice.

Yet another approach is to examine the ML solutions future states (actions) to determine if any of them impact the reward function itself and penalize it for doing this. This assumes that the future states are representative of what it plans to do and that some code or some person can recognize states that are inappropriate.

Another approach discussed in the paper is to have multiple reward signals. These could use multiple formulas for computing the multi-faceted reward signal and averaging them or using some other mathematical function to combine them into something that might be more accurate than one reward function alone. This way any ML solution reward hacking would need to hack multiple reward functions (or perhaps the function that combines them) in order to succeed.

The one IMHO that has the most potential but which seems the hardest to implement is to somehow create “variable indifference” in the ML/AI solution. This means having the ML/AI solution ignore any steps that impact the reward function itself or other steps that lead to reward hacking. The researchers rightfully state that if this were possible then many of the AI safety concerns could be dealt with.

There are many other approaches discussed and I would suggest reading the paper to learn more. None of the others, seem simple or a complete solution to all potential reward hacks.

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The paper goes into the same or more level of detail with the other three “concrete safety” issues in AI.

In my last post (see part 5 link above) I thought I was going to write about Human Compatible (AI) by S. Russell book’s discussion AI safety. But then I found the “Concrete problems in AI safety paper (see link above) and thought it provided a better summary of AI safety issues and used it instead. I’ll try to circle back to the book at some later date.

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Is AGI just a question of scale now – AGI part-5

Posted on by Ray in AGI, Cognitive computing, Neural network, Scenario planning, Strategic Inflection Points, Visionary leadershp

Read two articles over the past month or so. The more recent one was an Economist article (AI enters the industrial age, paywall) and the other was A generalist agent (from Deepmind). The Deepmind article was all about the training of Gato, a new transformer deep learning model trained to perform well on 600 separate task arenas from image captioning, to Atari games, to robotic pick and place tasks.

And then there was this one tweet from Nando De Frietas, research director at Deepmind:

“Someone’s opinion article. My opinion: It’s all about scale now! The Game is Over! It’s about making these models bigger, safer, compute efficient, faster at sampling, smarter memory, more modalities, INNOVATIVE DATA, on/offline, … 1/N“

I take this to mean that AGI is just a matter of more scale. Deepmind and others see the way to attain AGI is just a matter of throwing more servers, GPUs and data at the training the model.

We have discussed AGI in the past (see part-0 [ish], part-1 [ish], part-2 [ish], part-3ish and part-4 blog posts [We apologize, only started numbering them at 3ish]). But this tweet is possibly the first time we have someone in the know, saying they see a way to attain AGI.

Transformer models

It’s instructive from my perspective that, Gato is a deep learning transformer model. Also the other big NLP models have all been transformer models as well.

Gato (from Deepmind), SWITCH Transformer (from Google), GPT-3/GPT-J (from OpenAI), OPT (from meta), and Wu Dai 2.0 (from China’s latest supercomputer) are all trained on more and more text and image data scraped from the web, wikipedia and other databases.

Wikipedia says transformer models are an outgrowth of RNN and LSTM models that use attention vectors on text. Attention vectors encode, into a vector (matrix), all textual symbols (words) prior to the latest textual symbol. Each new symbol encountered creates another vector with all prior symbols plus the latest word. These vectors would then be used to train RNN models using all vectors to generate output.

The problem with RNN and LSTM models is that it’s impossible to parallelize. You always need to wait until you have encountered all symbols in a text component (sentence, paragraph, document) before you can begin to train.

Instead of encoding this attention vectors as it encounters each symbol, transformer models encode all symbols at the same time, in parallel and then feed these vectors into a DNN to assign attention weights to each symbol vector. This allows for complete parallelism which also reduced the computational load and the elapsed time to train transformer models.

And transformer models allowed for a large increase in DNN parameters (I read these as DNN nodes per layer X number of layers in a model). GATO has 1.2B parameters, GPT-3 has 175B parameters, and SWITCH Transformer is reported to have 7X more parameters than GPT-3 .

Estimates for how much it cost to train GPT-3 range anywhere from $10M-20M USD.

AGI will be here in 10 to 20 yrs at this rate

So if it takes ~$15M to train a 175B transformer model and Google has already done SWITCH which has 7-10X (~1.5T) the number of GPT-3 parameters. It seems to be an arms race.

If we assume it costs ~$65M (~2X efficiency gain since GPT-3 training) to train SWITCH, we can create some bounds as to how much it will cost to train an AGI model.

By the way, the number of synapses in the human brain is approximately 1000T (See Basic NN of the brain, …). If we assume that DNN nodes are equivalent to human synapses (a BIG IF), we probably need to get to over 1000T parameter model before we reach true AGI.

So my guess is that any AGI model lies somewhere between 650X to 6,500X parameters beyond SWITCH or between 1.5Q to 15Q model parameters.

If we assume current technology to do the training this would cost $40B to $400B to train. Of course, GPUs are not standing still and NVIDIA’s Hopper (introduced in 2022) is at least 2.5X faster than their previous gen, A100 GPU (introduced in 2020). So if we waited a 10 years, or so we might be able to reduce this cost by a factor of 100X and in 20 years, maybe by 10,000X, or back to where roughly where SWITCH is today.

So in the next 20 years most large tech firms should be able to create their own AGI models. In the next 10 years most governments should be able to train their own AGI models. And as of today, a select few world powers could train one, if they wanted to.

Where they get the additional data to train these models (I assume that data counts would go up linearly with parameter counts) may be another concern. However, I’m sure if you’re willing to spend $40B on AGI model training, spending a few $B more on data acquisition shouldn’t be a problem.

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At the end of the Deepmind article on Gato, it talks about the need for AGI safety in terms of developing preference learning, uncertainty modeling and value alignment. The footnote for this idea is the book, Human Compatible (AI) by S. Russell.

Preference learning is a mechanism for AGI to learn the “true” preference of a task it’s been given. For instance, if given the task to create toothpicks, it should realize the true preference is to not destroy the world in the process of making toothpicks.

Uncertainty modeling seems to be about having AI assume it doesn’t really understand what the task at hand truly is. This way there’s some sort of (AGI) humility when it comes to any task. Such that the AGI model would be willing to be turned off, if it’s doing something wrong. And that decision is made by humans.

Deepmind has an earlier paper on value alignment. But I see this as the ability of AGI to model human universal values (if such a thing exists) such as the sanctity of human life, the need for the sustainability of the planet’s ecosystem, all humans are created equal, all humans have the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, etc.

I can see a future post is needed soon on Human Compatible (AI).

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