Category: Systems

Steam Locomotive lessons for disk vs. SSD

Posted on by Ray in Data density, Market dynamics, Strategic Inflection Points, System effectiveness

Read a PHYS ORG article on Extinction of Steam Locomotives derails assumption about biological evolution… which was reporting on a Royal Society research paper The end of the line: competitive exclusion & the extinction… that looked at the historical record of steam locomotives since their inception in the early 19th century until their demise in the mid 20th century. Reading the article it seems to me to have a wider applicability than just to evolutionary extinction dynamics and in fact similar analysis could reveal some secrets of technological extinction.

Steam locomotives

During its 150 years of production, many competitive technologies emerged starting with electronic locomotives, followed by automobiles & trucks and finally, the diesel locomotive.

The researchers selected a single metric to track the evolution (or fitness) of the steam locomotive called tractive effort (TE) or the weight a steam locomotive could move. Early on, steam locomotives hauled both passengers and freight. The researchers included automobiles and trucks as competitive technologies because they do offer a way to move people and freight. The diesel locomotive was a more obvious competitor.

The dark line is a linear regression trend line on the wavy mean TE line, the boxes are the interquartile (25%-75%) range, the line within the boxes the median TE value, and the shaded areas 95% confidence interval for trend line of the steam locomotives TE that were produced that year. Raw data from Locobase, a steam locomotives database

One can see from the graph three phases. The red phase, from 1829-1881, there was unencumbered growth of TE for steam locomotives during this time. But in 1881, electric locomotives were introduced corresponding to the blue phase and after WW II the black phase led to the demise of steam.

Here (in the blue phase) we see a phenomena often seen with the introduction of competitive technologies, there seems to be an increase in innovation as the multiple technologies duke it out in the ecosystem.

Automobiles and trucks were introduced in 1901 but they don’t seem to impact steam locomotive TE. Possibly this is because the passenger and freight volume hauled by cars and trucks weren’t that significant. Or maybe it’ impact was more on the distances hauled.

In 1925 diesel locomotives were introduced. Again we don’t see an immediate change in trend values but over time this seemed to be the death knell of the steam locomotive.

The researchers identified four aspects to the tracking of inter-species competition:

  • A functional trait within the competitive species can be identified and tracked. For the steam locomotive this was TE,
  • Direct competitors for the specie can be identified that coexist within spatial, temporal and resource requirements. For the steam locomotive, autos/trucks and electronic/diesel locomotives.
  • A complete time series for the species/clade (group of related organisms) can be identified. This was supplied by Locobase
  • Non-competitive factors don’t apply or are irrelevant. There’s plenty here including most of the items listed on their chart.

From locomotives to storage

I’m not saying that disk is akin to steam locomotives while flash is akin to diesel but maybe. For example one could consider storage capacity as similar to locomotive TE. There’s a plethora of other factors that one could track over time but this one factor was relevant at the start and is still relevant today. What we in the industry lack is any true tracking of capacities produced since the birth of the disk drive 1956 (according to wikipedia History of hard disk drives article) and today.

But I’d venture to say the mean capacity have been trending up and the variance in that capacity have been static for years (based on more platter counts rather than anything else).

There are plenty of other factors that could be tracked for example areal density or $/GB.

Here’s a chart, comparing areal (2D) density growth of flash, disk and tape media between 2008 and 2018. Note both this chart and the following charts are Log charts.

Over the last 5 years NAND has gone 3D. Current NAND chips in production have 300+ layers. Disks went 3D back in the 1960s or earlier. And of course tape has always been 3D, as it’s a ribbon wrapped around reels within a cartridge.

So areal density plays a critical role but it’s only 2 of 3 dimensions that determine capacity. The areal density crossover point between HDD and NAND in 2013 seems significant to me and perhaps the history of disk

Here’s another chart showing the history of $/GB of these technologies

In this chart they are comparing price/GB of the various technologies (presumably the most economical available during that year). Trajectories in HDDs between 2008-2010 was on a 40%/year reduction trend in $/GB, then flat lined and now appears to be on a 20%/year reduction trend. Flash during 2008-2017 has been on a 25% reduction in $/GB for that period which flatlined in 2018. LTO Tape had been on a 25%/year reduction from 2008 through 2014 and since then has been on a 11% reduction.

If these $/GB trends continue, a big if, flash will overcome disk in $/GB and tape over time.

But here’s something on just capacity which seems closer to the TE chart for steam locomotives.

HDD capacity 1980-2020.

There’s some dispute regarding this chart as it only reflects drives available for retail and drives with higher capacities were not always available there. Nonetheless it shows a couple of interesting items. Early on up to ~1990 drive capacities were relatively stagnant. From 1995-20010 there was a significant increase in drive capacity and since 2010, drive capacities have seemed to stop increasing as much. We presume the number of x’s for a typical year shows different drive capacities available for retail sales, sort of similar to the box plots on the TE chart above

SSDs were first created in the early 90’s, but the first 1TB SSD came out around 2010. Since then the number of disk drives offered for retail (as depicted by Xs on the chart each year) seem to have declined and their range in capacity (other than ~2016) seem to have declined significantly.

If I take the lessons from the Steam Locomotive to heart here, one would have to say that the HDD has been forced to adapt to a smaller market than they had prior to 2010. And if areal density trends are any indication, it would seem that R&D efforts to increase capacity have declined or we have reached some physical barrier with todays media-head technologies. Although such physical barriers have always been surpassed after new technologies emerged.

What we really need is something akin to the Locobase for disk drives. That would track all disk drives sold during each year and that way we can truly see something similar to the chart tracking TE for steam locomotives. And this would allow us to see if the end of HDD is nigh or not.

Final thoughts on technology Extinction dynamics

The Royal Society research had a lot to say about the dynamics of technology competition. And they had other charts in their report but I found this one very interesting.

This shows an abstract analysis of Steam Locomotive data. They identify 3 zones of technology life. The safe zone where the technology has no direct competitions. The danger zone where competition has emerged but has not conquered all of the technologies niche. And the extinction zone where competing technology has entered every niche that the original technology existed.

In the late 90s, enterprise disk supported high performance/low capacity, medium performance/medium capacity and low performance/high capacity drives. Since then, SSDs have pretty much conquered the high performance/low capacity disk segment. And with the advent of QLC and PLC (4 and 5 bits per cell) using multi-layer NAND chips, SSDs seem poisedl to conquer the low performance/high capacity niche. And there are plenty of SSDs using MLC/TLC (2 or 3 bits per cell) with multi-layer NAND to attack the medium performance/medium capacity disk market.

There were also very small disk drives at one point which seem to have been overtaken by M.2 flash.

On the other hand, just over 95% of all disk and flash storage capacity being produced today is disk capacity. So even though disk is clearly in the extinction zone with respect to flash storage, it’s seems to still be doing well.

It would be wonderful to have a similar analysis done on transistors vs vacuum tubes, jet vs propeller propulsion, CRT vs. LED screens, etc. Maybe at some point with enough studies we could have a theory of technological extinction that can better explain the dynamics impacting the storage and other industries today.

Comments,

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AWS Data Exchange vs Data Banks – part 2

Posted on by Ray in Artificial Intelligence, Cloud services, Cognitive computing, Data, data access, Data banks, Data economy, Data ownership, Data withdrawals, Deep Learning, Information economy, Initial Data Offerings (IDOs), Machine Learning, Neural network, Strategic Inflection Points

Saw where AWS announced a new Data Exchange service on their AWS Pi day 2023. This is a completely managed service available on the AWS market place to monetize data.

In a prior post on a topic I called data banks (Data banks, data deposits & data withdrawals…), I talked about the need to have some sort of automated support for personal data that would allow us to monetize it.

The hope then (4.5yrs ago) was that social media, search and other web services would supply all the data they have on us back to us and we could then sell it to others that wanted to use it.

In that post, I called the data the social media gave back to us data deposits, the place where that data was held and sold a data bank, and the sale of that data a data withdrawal. (I know talking about banks deposits and withdrawals is probably not a great idea right now but this was back a ways).

AWS Data Exchange

1918 Farm Auction by dok1 (cc) (from Flickr)
1918 Farm Auction by dok1 (cc) (from Flickr)

With AWS Data Exchange, data owners can sell their data to data consumers. And it’s a completely AWS managed service. One presumably creates an S3 bucket with the data you want to sell. determine a price to sell the data for and a period clients can access that data for and register this with AWS and the AWS Data Exchange will support any number of clients purchasing data data.

Presumably, (although unstated in the service announcement), you’d be required to update and curate the data to insure it’s correct and current but other than that once the data is on S3 and the offer is in place you could just sit back and take the cash coming in.

I see the AWS Data Exchange service as a step on the path of data monetization for anyone. Yes it’s got to be on S3, and yes it’s via AWS marketplace, which means that AWS gets a cut off any sale, but it’s certainly a step towards a more free-er data marketplace.

Changes I would like to AWS Data Exchange service

Putting aside the need to have more than just AWS offer such a service, and I heartedly request that all cloud service providers make a data exchange or something similar as a fully supported offering of their respective storage services. This is not quite the complete data economy or ecosystem that I had envisioned in September of 2018.

If we just focus on the use (data withdrawal) side of a data economy, which is the main thing AWS data exchange seems to supports, there’s quite a few missing features IMHO,

  • Data use restrictions – We don’t want customers to obtain a copy of our data. We would very much like to restrict them to reading it and having plain text access to the data only during the period they have paid to access it. Once that period expires all copies of data needs to be destroyed programmatically, cryptographically or in some other permanent/verifiable fashion. This can’t be done through just license restrictions. Which seems to be the AWS Data Exchanges current approach. Not sure what a viable alternative might be but some sort of time-dependent or temporal encryption key that could be expired would be one step but customers would need to install some sort of data exchange service on their servers using the data that would support encryption access/use.
  • Data traceability – Yes, clients who purchase access should have access to the data for whatever they want to use it for. But there should be some way to trace where our data ended up or was used for. If it’s to help train a NN, then I would like to see some sort of provenance or certificate applied to that NN, in a standardized structure, to indicate that it made use of our data as part of its training. Similarly, if it’s part of an online display tool somewhere in the footnotes of the UI would be a data origins certificate list which would have some way to point back to our data as the source of the information presented. Ditto for any application that made use of the data. AWS Data Exchange does nothing to support this. In reality something like this would need standards bodies to create certificates and additional structures for NN, standard application packages, online services etc. that would retain and provide proof of data origins via certificates.
  • Data locality – there are some juristictions around the world which restrict where data generated within their boundaries can be sent, processed or used. I take it that AWS Data Exchange deals with these restrictions by either not offering data under jurisdictional restrictions for sale outside governmental boundaries or gating purchase of the data outside valid jurisdictions. But given VPNs and similar services, this seems to be less effective. If there’s some sort of temporal key encryption service to make use of our data then its would seem reasonable to add some sort of regional key encryption addition to it.
  • Data audibility – there needs to be some way to insure that our data is not used outside the organizations that have actually paid for it. And that if there’s some sort of data certificate saying that the application or service that used the data has access to that data, that this mechanism is mandated to be used, supported, and validated. In reality, something like this would need a whole re-thinking of how data is used in society. Financial auditing took centuries to take hold and become an effective (sometimes?) tool to monitor against financial abuse. Data auditing would need many of the same sorts of functionality, i.e. Certified Data Auditors, Data Accounting Standards Board (DASB) which defines standardized reports as to how an entity is supposed to track and report on data usage, governmental regulations which requires public (and private?) companies to report on the origins of the data they use on a yearly/quarterly basis, etc.

Probably much more that could be added here but this should suffice for now.

other changes to AWS Data Exchange processes

The AWS Pi Day 2023 announcement didn’t really describe the supplier end of how the service works. How one registers a bucket for sale was not described. I’d certainly want some sort of stenography service to tag the data being sold with the identity of those who purchased it. That way there might be some possibility to tracking who released any data exchange data into the wild.

Also, how the data exchange data access is billed for seems a bit archaic. As far as I can determine one gets unlimited access to data for some defined period (N months) for some specific amount ($s). And once that period expires, customers have to pay up or cease accessing the S3 data. I’d prefer to see at least a GB/month sort of cost structure that way if a customer copies all the data they pay for that privilege and if they want to reread the data multiple times they get to pay for that data access. Presumably this would require some sort of solution to the data use restrictions above to enforce.

Data banks, deposits, withdrawals and Initial Data Offerings (IDOs)

The earlier post talks about an expanded data ecosystem or economy. And I won’t revisit all that here but one thing that I believe may be worth re-examining is Initial Data Offerings or IDOs.

As described in the earlier post, IDO’ss was a mechanism for data users to request permanent access to our data but in exchange instead of supplying it for a one time fee, they would offer data equity in the service.

Not unlike VC, each data provider would be supplied some % (data?) ownership in the service and over time data ownership get’s diluted at further data raises but at some point when the service is profitable, data ownership units could be purchased outright, so that the service could exit it’s private data use stage and go public (data use).

Yeah, this all sounds complex, and AWS Data Exchange just sells data once and you have access to it for some period, establishing data usage rights.. But I think that in order to compensate users for their data there needs to be something like IDOs that provides data ownership shares in some service that can be transferred (sold) to others.

I didn’t flesh any of that out in the original post but I still think it’s the only way to truly compensate individuals (and corporations) for the (free) use of the data that web, AI and other systems are using to create their services.

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I wrote the older post in 2018 because I saw the potential for our data to be used by others to create/trlain services that generate lots of money for those organization but without any of our knowledge, outright consent and without compensating us for the data we have (indadvertenly or advertently) created over our life span.

As an example One can see how Getty Images is suing DALL-E 2 and others have had free use of their copyrighted materials to train their AI NN. If one looks underneath the covers of ChatGPT, many image processing/facial recognition services, and many other NN, much of the data used in training them was obtained by scrapping web pages that weren’t originally intended to supply this sorts of data to others.

For example, it wouldn’t surprise me to find out that RayOnStorage posts text has been scrapped from the web and used to train some large language model like ChatGPT.

Do I receive any payment or ownership equity in any of these services – NO. I write these blog posts partially as a means of marketing my other consulting services but also because I have an abiding interest in the subject under discussion. I’m happy for humanity to read these and welcome comments on them by humans. But I’m not happy to have llm or other RNs use my text to train their models.

On the other hand, I’d gladly sell access to RayOnStorage posts text if they offered me a high but fair price for their use of it for some time period say one year… 🙂

Comments?

Data and code versioning For MLops

Posted on by Ray in Artificial Intelligence, Data, Data ownership, Data versioning, Machine Learning, MLOps, Object storage

Read an interesting article (Ex-Apple engineers raise … data storage startup) and research paper (Git is for data) about a of group of ML engineers from Apple forming a new “data storage” startup targeted at MLOps teams just like Apple. It turns out that MLops has some very unique data requirements that go way beyond just data storage.

The paper discusses some of the unusual data requirements for MLOps such as:

  • Infrequent updates – yes there are some MLOps datasets where updates are streamed in but the vast majority of MLOps datasets are updated on a slower cadence. The authors think monthly works for most MLOps teams
  • Small changes/lots of copies – The changes to MLOps data are relatively small compared to the overall dataset size and usually consist of data additions, record deletions, label updates, etc. But uncommon to most data, MLOps data are often subsetted or extracted into smaller datasets used for testing, experimentation and other “off-label” activities.
  • Variety of file types – depending on the application domain, MLOps file types range all over the place. But there’s often a lot of CSV files in combination with text, images, audio, and semi-structured data (DICOM, FASTQ, sensor streams, etc.). However within a single domain, MLOps file types are pretty much all the same.
  • Variety of file directory trees – this is very MLOps team and model dependent. Usually there are train/validate/test splits to every MLOps dataset but what’s underneath each of these can vary a lot and needs to be user customizable.
  • Data often requires pre-processing to be cleansed and made into something appropriate and more useable by ML models
  • Code and data must co-evolve together, over time – as data changes, the code that uses them change. Adding more data may not cause changes to code but models are constantly under scrutiny to improve performance, accuracy or remove biases. Bias elimination often requires data changes but code changes may also be needed.

It’s that last requirement, MLOps data and code must co-evolve and thus, need to be versioned together that’s most unusual. Data-code co-evolution is needed for reproducibility, rollback and QA but also for many other reasons as well.

In the paper they show a typical MLOps data pipeline.

Versioning can also provide data (and code) provenance, identifying the origin of data (and code). MLOps teams undergoing continuous integration need to know where data and code came from and who changed them. And as most MLOps teams collaborate in the development, they also need a way to identify data and code conflicts when multiple changes occur to the same artifact.

Source version control

Code has had this versioning problem forever and the solution became revision control systems (RCS) or source version control (SVC) systems. The most popular solutions for code RCS are Git (software) and GitHub (SaaS). Both provide repositories and source code version control (clone, checkout, diff, add/merge, commit, etc.) as well as a number of other features that enable teams of developers to collaborate on code development.

The only thing holding Git/GitHub back from being the answer to MLOps data and code version control is that they don’t handle large (>1MB) files very well.

The solution seems to be adding better data handling capabilities to Git or GitHub. And that’s what XetHub has created for Git.

XetHub’s “Git is Data” paper (see link above) explains what they do in much detail, as to how they provide a better data layer to Git, but it boils down to using Git for code versioning and as a metadata database for their deduplicating data store. They are using a Merkle trees to track the chunks of data in a deduped dataset.

How XetHub works

XetHub support (dedupe) variable chunking capabilities for their data store. This allows them to use relatively small files checked into Git to provide the metadata to point to the current (and all) previous versions of data files checked into the system.

Their mean chunk size is ~4KB. Data chunks are stored in their data store. But the manifest for dataset versions is effectively stored in the Git repository.

The paper shows how using a deduplicated data store can support data versioning.

XetHub uses a content addressable store (CAS) to store the file data chunk(s) as objects or BLOBs. The key to getting good IO performance out of such a system is to have small chunks but large objects.

They map data chunks to files using a CDMT (content defined merkle tree[s]). Each chunk of data resides in at least two different CDMTs, one associated with the file version and the other associated with the data storage elements.

XetHub’s variable chunking approach is done using a statistical approach and multiple checksums but they also offer one specialized file type chunking for CSV files. As it is, even with their general purpose variable chunking method, they can offer ~9X dedupe ratio for text data (embeddings).

They end up using Git commands for code and data but provide hooks (Git filters) to support data cloning, add/checkin, commits, etc.). So they can take advantage of all the capabilities of Git that have grown up over the years to support code collaborative development but use these for data as well as code.

In addition to normal Git services for code and data, XetHub also offers a read-only, NFSv3 file system interface to XetHub datases. Doing this eliminates having to reconstitute and copy TB of data from their code-data repo to user workstations. With NFSv3 front end access to XetHub data, users can easily incorporate data access for experimentation, testing and other uses.

Results from using XetHub

XetHub showed some benchmarks comparing their solution to GIT LFS, another Git based large data storage solution. For their benchmark, they used the CORD-19 (and ArXiv paper, and Kaggle CORD-I9 dataset) which is a corpus of all COVID-19 papers since COVID started. The corpus is updated daily, released periodically and they used the last 50 versions (up to June 2022) of the research corpus for their benchmark.

Each version of the CORD-19 corpus consists of JSON files (research reports, up to 700K each) and 2 large CSV files one with paper information and the other paper (word?) embeddings (a more useable version of the paper text/tables used for ML modeling).

For CORD-19, XetHub are able to store all the 2.45TB of research reports and CSV files in only 287GB of Git (metadata) and datastore data, or with a dedupe factor 8.7X. With XetHub’s specialized CSV chunking (Xet w/ CSV chunking above), the CORD-19 50 versions can be stored in 87GB or with a 28.8X dedupe ratio. And of that 87GB, only 82GB is data and the rest ~5GB is metadata (of which 1.7GB is the merle tree).

In the paper, they also showed the cost of branching this data by extracting and adding one version which consisted of a 75-25% (random) split of a version. This split was accomplished by changing only the two (paper metadata and paper word embeddings) CSV files. Adding this single split version to their code-data repository/datastore only took an additional 11GB of space An aligned split (only partitioning on a CSV record boundary, unclear but presumably with CSV chunking), only added 185KB.

XETHUB Potential Enhancements

XetHub envisions many enhancements to their solution, including adding other specific file type chunking strategies, adding a “time series” view to their NFS frontend to view code/data versions over time, finer granularity data provenance (at the record level rather than at the change level), and RW NFS access to data. Further, XetHub’s dedupe metadata (on the Git repo) only grows over time, supporting updates and deletes to dedupe metadata would help reduce data requirements.

Read the paper to find out more.

Picture/Graphic credit(s):

FAST(HARD) or Slow(soft)AGI takeoff – AGI Part 6

Posted on by Ray in AGI, Cognitive computing, Distributed computing, Forecasting, Scenario planning, Strategic Inflection Points

I was listening to a podcast a couple of weeks back and the person being interviewed made a comment that he didn’t believe that AGI would have a fast (hard) take off rather it would be slow (soft). Here’s the podcast John Carmack interviewed by Lex Fridman).

Hard vs. soft takeoff

A hard (fast) takeoff implies a relatively quick transition (seconds, hours, days, or months) between AGI levels of intelligence and super AGI levels of intelligence. A soft (slow) takeoff implies it would take a long time (years, decades, centuries) to go from AGI to super AGI.

We’ve been talking about AGI for a while now and if you want to see more about our thoughts on the topic, check out our AGI posts (in most recent order: AGI part 5, part 4, part 3 (ish), part (2), part (1), and part (0)).

The real problem is that many believe that any AGI that reaches super-intelligence will have drastic consequences for the earth and especially, for humanity. However, this is whole other debate.

The view is that a slow AGI takeoff might (?) allow sufficient time to imbue any and all (super) AGI with enough safeguards to eliminate or minimize any existential threat to humanity and life on earth (see part (1) linked above).

A fast take off won’t give humanity enough time to head off this problem and will likely result in an humanity ending and possibly, earth destroying event.

Hard vs Soft takeoff – the debate

I had always considered AGI would have a hard take off but Carmack seemed to think otherwise. His main reason is that current large transformer models (closest thing to AGI we have at the moment) are massive and take lots of special purpose (GPU/TPU/IPU) compute, lots of other compute and gobs and gobs of data to train on. Unclear what the requirements are to perform inferencing but suffice it to say it should be less.

And once AGI levels of intelligence were achieved, it would take a long time to acquire any additional regular or special purpose hardware, in secret, required to reach super AGI.

So, to just be MECE (mutually exclusive and completely exhaustive) on the topic, the reasons researchers and other have posited to show that AGI will have a soft takeoff, include:

  • AI hardware for training and inferencing AGI is specialized, costly, and acquisition of more will be hard to keep secret and as such, will take a long time to accomplish;
  • AI software algorithmic complexity needed to build better AGI systems is significantly hard (it’s taken 70yrs for humanity to reach todays much less than AGI intelligent systems) and will become exponentially harder to go beyond AGI level systems. This additional complexity will delay any take off;
  • Data availability to train AGI is humongous, hard to gather, find, & annotate properly. Finding good annotated data to go beyond AGI will be hard and will take a long time to obtain;
  • Human government and bureaucracy will slow it down and/or restrict any significant progress made in super AGI;
  • Human evolution took Ms of years to go from chimp levels of intelligence to human levels of intelligence, why would electronic evolution be 6-9 orders of magnitude faster.
  • AGI technology is taking off but the level of intelligence are relatively minor and specialized today. One could say that modern AI has been really going since the 1990s so we are 30yrs in and today have almost good AI chatbots today and AI agents that can summarize passages/articles, generate text from prompts or create art works from text. If it takes another 30 yrs to get to AGI, it should provide sufficient time to build in capabilities to limit super-AGI hard take off.

I suppose it’s best to take these one at a time.

  • Hardware acquisition difficulty – I suppose the easiest way for an intelligent agent to acquire additional hardware would be to crack cloud security and just take it. Other ways may be to obtain stolen credit card information and use these to (il)legally purchase more compute. Another approach is to optimize the current AGI algorithms to run better within the same AGI HW envelope, creating super AGI that doesn’t need any more hardware at all.
  • Software complexity growing – There’s no doubt that AGI software will be complex (although the podcast linked to above, is sub-titled that “AGI software will be simple”). But any sub-AGI agent that can change it’s code to become better or closer to AGI, should be able to figure out how not to stop at AGI levels of intelligence and just continue optimizating until it reaches some wall. i
  • Data acquisition/annotation will be hard – I tend to think the internet is the answer to any data limitations that might be present to an AGI agent. Plus, I’ve always questioned if Wikipedia and some select other databases wouldn’t be all an AGI would need to train on to attain super AGI. Current transformer models are trained on Wikipedia dumps and other data scraped from the internet. So there’s really two answers to this question, once internet access is available it’s unclear that there would be need for anymore data. And, with the data available to current transformers, it’s unclear that this isn’t already more than enough to reach super AGI
  • Human bureaucracy will prohibit it: Sadly this is the easiest to defeat. 1) there are roque governments and actors around the world with more than sufficient resources to do this on their own. And no agency, UN or otherwise, will be able to stop them. 2) unlike nuclear, the technology to do AI (AGI) is widely available to business and governments, all AI research is widely published (mostly open access nowadays) and if anything colleges/universities around the world are teaching the next round of AI scientists to take this on. 3) the benefits for being first are significant and is driving a weapons (AGI) race between organizations, companies, and countries to be first to get there.
  • Human evolution took Millions of years, why would electronic be 6-9 orders of magnitude faster – electronic computation takes microseconds to nanoseconds to perform operations and humans probably 0.1 sec, or so. Electronics is already 5 to 8 orders of magnitude faster than humans today. Yes the human brain is more than one CPU core (each neuron would be considered a computational element). But there are 64 core CPUs/4096 CORE GPUs out there today and probably one could consider similar in nature if taken in the aggregate (across a hyperscaler lets say). So, just using the speed ups above it should take anywhere from 1/1000 of a year to 1 year to cover the same computational evolution as human evolution covered between the chimp and human and accordingly between AGI and AGIx2 (ish).
  • AGI technology is taking a long time to reach, which should provide sufficient time to build in safeguards – Similar to the discussion on human bureaucracy above, with so many actors taking this on and the advantages of even a single AGI (across clusters of agents) would be significant, my guess is that the desire to be first will obviate any thoughts on putting in safeguards.

Other considerations for super AGI takeoff

Once you have one AGI trained why wouldn’t some organization, company or country deploy multiple agents. Moreover, inferencing takes orders of magnitude less computational power than training. So with 1/100-1/1000th the infrastructure, one could have a single AGI. But the real question is wouldn’t a 100- or 1000-AGis represent super intelligence?

Yes and no, 100 humans doesn’t represent super intelligence and a 1000 even less so. But humans have other desires, it’s unclear that 100 humans super focused on one task wouldn’t represent super intelligence (on that task).

Interior view of a data center with equipment

What can be done to slow AGI takeoff today

Baring something on the order of Nuclear Proliferation treaties/protocols, putting all GPUs/TPUs/IPUs on weapons export limitations AND restricting as secret, any and all AI research, nothing easily comes to mind. Of course Nuclear Proliferation isn’t looking that good at the moment, but whatever it’s current state, it has delayed proliferation over time.

One could spend time and effort slowing technology progress down. Such as by reducing next generation CPU/GPU/IPU compute cores , limiting compute speedups, reduce funding for AI research, putting a compute tax, etc. All of which, if done across the technological landscape and the whole world, could give humanity more time to build in AGI safeguards. But doing so would adversely impact all technological advancement, in healthcare, business, government, etc. And given the proliferation of current technology and the state actors working on increasing capabilities to create more, it would be hard to envision slowing technological advancement down much, if at all.

It’s almost like putting a tax on slide rules or making their granularity larger.

It could be that super AGI would independently perceive itself benignly, and only provide benefit to humanity and the earth. But, my guess is that given the number of bad actors intent on controlling the world, even if this were true, they would try to (re-)direct it to harm segments of humanity/society. And once unleashed, it would be hard to stop.

The only real solution to AGI in bad actor hands, is to educate all of humanity to value all humans and to cherish the environment we all live in as sacred. This would eliminate bad actors,

It sounds so naive, but in reality, it’s the only thing, I believe, the only way we can truly hope to get us through this AGI technological existential crisis.

Just like nuclear, we as a society will keep running into technological existential crisis’s like this. Heading all these off, with a better more all inclusive, more all embracing, and less combative humanity could help all of them.

Comments?

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The Hollowing out of enterprise IT

Posted on by Ray in Cloud services, Forecasting, IoT, Market dynamics, Storage, Strategic Inflection Points, Strategic planning, Visionary leadershp

We had a relatively long discussion yesterday, amongst a bunch of independent analysts and one topic that came up was my thesis that enterprise IT is being hollowed out by two forces pulling in opposite directions on their apps. Those forces are the cloud and the edge.

Western part of the abandoned Packard Automotive Plant in Detroit, Michigan. by Albert Duce

Cloud sirens

The siren call of the cloud for business units, developers and modern apps has been present for a long time now. And their call is more omnipresent than Odysseus ever had to deal with.

The cloud’s allure is primarily low cost-instant infrastructure that just works, a software solution/tool box that’s overflowing, with locations close to most major metropolitan areas, and the extreme ease of starting up.

If your app ever hopes to scale to meet customer demand, where else can you go. If your data can literally come in from anywhere, it usually lands on the cloud. And if you have need for modern solutions, tools, frameworks or just about anything the software world can create, there’s nowhere else with more of this than the cloud.

Pre-cloud, all those apps would have run in the enterprise or wouldn’t have run at all. And all that data would have been funneled back into the enterprise.

Not today, the cloud has it all, its siren call is getting louder everyday, ever ready to satisfy every IT desire anyone could possibly have, except for the edge.

The Edge, last bastion for onsite infrastructure

The edge sort of emerged over the last decade or so kind of in stealth mode. Yes there were always pockets of edge, with unique compute or storage needs. For example, video surveillance has been around forever but the real acceleration of edge deployments started over the last decade or so as compute and storage prices came down drastically.

These days, the data being generated is stagering and compute requirements that go along with all that data are all over the place, from a few ARMv/RISC V cores to a server farm.

For instance, CERN’s LHC creates a PB of data every second of operation (see IEEE Spectrum article, ML shaking up particle physics too). But they don’t store all that. So they use extensive compute (and ML) to try to only store interesting events.

Seismic ships roam the seas taking images of underground structures, generating gobs of data, some of which is processed on ship and the rest elsewhere. A friend of mine creates RPi enabled devices that measure tank liquid levels deployed in the field.

More recently, smart cars are like a data center on tires, rolling across roads around the world generating more data than you want can even imagine. 5G towers are data centers ontop of buildings, in farmland, and in cell towers doting the highways of today. All off the beaten path, and all places where no data center has ever gone before.

In olden days there would have been much less processing done at the edge and more in an enterprise data center. But nowadays, with the advent of relatively cheap computing and storage, data can be pre-processed, compressed, tagged all done at the edge, and then sent elsewhere for further processing (mostly done in the cloud of course).

IT Vendors at the crossroads

And what does the hollowing out of the enterprise data centers mean for IT server and storage vendors, mostly danger lies ahead. Enterprise IT hardware spend will stop growing, if it hasn’t already, and over time, shrink dramatically. It may be hard to see this today, but it’s only a matter of time.

Certainly, all these vendors can become more cloud like, on prem, offering compute and storage as a service, with various payment options to make it easier to consume. And for storage vendors, they can take advantage of their installed base by providing software versions of their systems running in the cloud that allows for easier migration and onboarding to the cloud. The server vendors have no such option. I see all the above as more of a defensive, delaying or holding action.

This is not to say the enterprise data centers will go away. Just like, mainframe and tape before them, on prem data centers will exist forever, but will be relegated to smaller and smaller, niche markets, that won’t grow anymore. But, only as long as vendor(s) continue to upgrade technology AND there’s profit to be made.

It’s just that that astronomical growth, that’s been happening ever since the middle of last century, happen in enterprise hardware anymore.

Long term life for enterprise vendors will be hard(er)

Over the long haul, some server vendors may be able to pivot to the edge. But the diversity of compute hardware there will make it difficult to generate enough volumes to make a decent profit there. However, it’s not to say that there will be 0 profits there, just less. So, when I see a Dell or HPE server, under the hood of my next smart car or inside the guts of my next drone, then and only then, will I see a path forward (or sustained revenue growth) for these guys.

For enterprise storage vendors, their future prospects look bleak in comparison. Despite the data generation and growth at the edge, I don’t see much of a role for them there. The enterprise class feature and functionality, they have spent the decades creating and nurturing aren’t valued as much in the cloud nor are they presently needed in the edge. Maybe I’m missing something here, but I just don’t see a long term play for them in the cloud or edge.

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For the record, all this is conjecture on my part. But I have always believed that if you follow where new apps are being created, there you will find a market ready to explode. And where the apps are no longer being created, there you will see a market in the throws of a slow death.

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Safe AI

Posted on by Ray in AGI, Artificial Intelligence, Cognitive computing, Information economy, Machine Learning, Reinforcement Learning, Robots, Scenario planning, Strategic Inflection Points, System quality

I’ve been writing about AGI (see part-0 [ish], part-1 [ish], part-2 [ish], part-3ish, part-4 and part 5) and the dangers that come with it (part-0 in the above list) for a number of years now. My last post on the subject I expected to be writing a post discussing the book Human compatible AI and the problem of control which is a great book on the subject. But since then I ran across another paper that perhaps is a better brief introduction into the topic and some of the current thought and research into developing safe AI.

The article I found is Concrete problems in AI, written by a number of researchers at Google, Stanford, Berkley, and OpenAI. It essentially lays out the AI safety problem in 5 dimensions and these are:

Avoiding negative side effects – these can be minor or major and is probably the one thing that scares humans the most, some toothpick generating AI that strips the world to maximize toothpick making.

Avoiding reward hacking – this is more subtle but essentially it’s having your AI fool you in that it’s doing what you want but doing something else. This could entail actually changing the reward logic itself to being able to convince/manipulate the human overseer into seeing things it’s way. Also a pretty bad thing from humanity’s perspective

Scalable oversight – this is the problem where human(s) overseers aren’t able to keep up and witness/validate what some AI is doing, 7×24, across the world, at the speed of electronics. So how can AI be monitored properly so that it doesn’t go and do something it’s not supposed to (see the prior two for ideas on how bad this could be).

Safe exploration – this is the idea that reinforcement learning in order to work properly has to occasionally explore a solution space, e.g. a Go board with moves selected at random, to see if they are better then what it currently believes are the best move to make. This isn’t much of a problem for game playing ML/AI but if we are talking about helicopter controlling AI, exploration at random could destroy the vehicle plus any nearby structures, flora or fauna, including humans of course.

Robustness to distributional shifts – this is the perrennial problem where AI or DNNs are trained on one dataset but over time the real world changes and the data it’s now seeing has shifted (distribution) to something else. This often leads to DNNs not operating properly over time or having many more errors in deployment than it did during training. This is probably the one problem in this list that is undergoing more research to try to rectify than any of the others because it impacts just about every ML/AI solution currently deployed in the world today. This robustness to distributional shifts problem is why many AI DNN systems require periodic retraining.

So now we know what to look for, now what

Each of these deserves probably a whole book or more to understand and try to address. The paper talks about all of these and points to some of the research or current directions trying to address them.

The researchers correctly point out that some of the above problems are more pressing when more complex ML/AI agents have more autonomous control over actions in the real world.

We don’t want our automotive automation driving us over a cliff just to see if it’s a better action than staying in the lane. But Go playing bots or article summarizers might be ok to be wrong occasionally if it could lead to better playing bots/more concise article summaries over time. And although exploration is mostly a problem during training, it’s not to say that such activities might not also occur during deployment to probe for distributional shifts or other issues.

However, as we start to see more complex ML AI solutions controlling more activities, the issue of AI safety are starting to become more pressing. Autonomous cars are just one pressing example. But recent introductions of sorting robots, agricultural bots, manufacturing bots, nursing bots, guard bots, soldier bots, etc. are all just steps down a -(short) path of increasing complexity that can only end in some AGI bots running more parts (or all) of the world.

So safety will become a major factor soon, if it’s not already

Scares me the most

The first two on the list above scare me the most. Avoiding negative or unintentional side effects and reward hacking.

I suppose if we could master scalable oversight we could maybe deal with all of them better as well. But that’s defense. I’m all about offense and tackling the problem up front rather than trying to deal with it after it’s broken.

Negative side effects

Negative side effects is a rather nice way of stating the problem of having your ML destroy the world (or parts of it) that we need to live.

One approach to dealing with this problem is to define or train another AI/ML agent to measure impacts the environment and have it somehow penalize the original AI/ML for doing this. The learning approach has some potential to be applied to numerous ML activities if it can be shown to be safe and fairly all encompassing.

Another approach discussed in the paper is to inhibit or penalize the original ML actions for any actions which have negative consequences. One approach to this is to come up with an “empowerment measure” for the original AI/ML solution. The idea would be to reduce, minimize or govern the original ML’s action set (or potential consequences) or possible empowerment measure so as to minimize its ability to create negative side effects.

The paper discusses other approaches to the problem of negative side effects, one of which is having multiple ML (or ML and human) agents working on the problem it’s trying to solve together and having the ability to influence (kill switch) each other when they discover something’s awry. And the other approach they mention is to reduce the certainty of the reward signal used to train the ML solution. This would work by having some function that would reduce the reward if there are random side effects, which would tend to have the ML solution learn to avoid these.

Neither of these later two seem as feasible as the others but they are all worthy of research.

Reward hacking

This seems less of a problem to our world than negative side effects until you consider that if an ML agent is able to manipulate its reward code, it’s probably able to manipulate any code intending to limit potential impacts, penalize it for being more empowered or manipulate a human (or other agent) with its hand over the kill switch (or just turn off the kill switch).

So this problem could easily lead to a break out of any of the other problems present on the list of safety problems above and below. An example of reward hacking is a game playing bot that detects a situation that leads to buffer overflow and results in win signal or higher rewards. Such a bot will no doubt learn how to cause more buffer overflows so it can maximize its reward rather than learn to play the game better.

But the real problem is that a reward signal used to train a ML solution is just an approximation of what’s intended. Chess programs in the past were trained by masters to use their opening to open up the center of the board and use their middle and end game to achieve strategic advantages. But later chess and go playing bots just learned to checkmate their opponent and let the rest of the game take care of itself.

Moreover, (board) game play is relatively simple domain to come up with proper reward signals (with the possible exception of buffer overflows or other bugs). But car driving bots, drone bots, guard bots, etc., reward signals are not nearly as easy to define or implement.

One approach to avoid reward hacking is to make the reward signaling process its own ML/AI agent that is (suitably) stronger than the ML/AI agent learning the task. Most reward generators are relatively simple code. For instance in monopoly, one that just counts the money that each player has at the end of the game could be used to determine the winner (in a timed monopoly game). But rather than having a simple piece of code create the reward signal use ML to learn what the reward should be. Such an agent might be trained to check to see if more or less money was being counted than was physically possible in the game. Or if property was illegally obtained during the game or if other reward hacks were done. And penalize the ML solution for these actions. These would all make the reward signal depend on proper training of that ML solution. And the two ML solutions would effectively compete against one another.

Another approach is to “sandbox” the reward code/solution so that it is outside of external and or ML/AI influence. Possible combining the prior approach with this one might suffice.

Yet another approach is to examine the ML solutions future states (actions) to determine if any of them impact the reward function itself and penalize it for doing this. This assumes that the future states are representative of what it plans to do and that some code or some person can recognize states that are inappropriate.

Another approach discussed in the paper is to have multiple reward signals. These could use multiple formulas for computing the multi-faceted reward signal and averaging them or using some other mathematical function to combine them into something that might be more accurate than one reward function alone. This way any ML solution reward hacking would need to hack multiple reward functions (or perhaps the function that combines them) in order to succeed.

The one IMHO that has the most potential but which seems the hardest to implement is to somehow create “variable indifference” in the ML/AI solution. This means having the ML/AI solution ignore any steps that impact the reward function itself or other steps that lead to reward hacking. The researchers rightfully state that if this were possible then many of the AI safety concerns could be dealt with.

There are many other approaches discussed and I would suggest reading the paper to learn more. None of the others, seem simple or a complete solution to all potential reward hacks.

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The paper goes into the same or more level of detail with the other three “concrete safety” issues in AI.

In my last post (see part 5 link above) I thought I was going to write about Human Compatible (AI) by S. Russell book’s discussion AI safety. But then I found the “Concrete problems in AI safety paper (see link above) and thought it provided a better summary of AI safety issues and used it instead. I’ll try to circle back to the book at some later date.

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AI navigation goes with the flow

Posted on by Ray in AGI, Deep Learning, Drones, Machine Learning, Mobile computing, Neural network, Reinforcement Learning, Robots, Strategic Inflection Points

Read an article the other day (Engineers Teach AI to Navigate Ocean with Minimal Energy) about a simulated robot that was trained to navigate 2D turbulent water flow to travel between locations. They used a combination reinforcement learning with a DNN derived policy. The article was reporting on a Nature Communications open access paper (Learning efficient navigation in vortical flow fields).

The team was attempting to create an autonomous probe that could navigate the ocean and other large bodies of water to gather information. I believe ultimately the intent was to provide the navigational smarts for a submersible that could navigate terrestrial and non-terrestrial oceans.

One of the biggest challenges for probes like this is to be able to navigate turbulent flow without needing a lot of propulsive power and using a lot of computational power. They said that any probe that could propel itself faster than the current could easily travel wherever it wanted but the real problem was to go somewhere with lower powered submersibles.. As a result, they set their probe to swim at a constant speed at 80% of the overall simulated water flow.

Even that was relatively feasible if you had unlimited computational power to train and inference with but trying to do this on something that could fit in a small submersible was a significant challenge. NLP models today have millions of parameters and take hours to train with multiple GPU/CPU cores in operation and lots of memory Inferencing using these NLP models also takes a lot of processing power.

The researchers targeted the computational power to something significantly smaller and wished to train and perform real time inferencing on the same hardware. They chose a “Teensy 4.0 micro-controller” board for their computational engine which costs under $20, had ~2MB of flash memory and fit in a space smaller than 1.5″x1.0″ (38.1mm X 25.4mm).

The simulation setup

The team started their probe turbulent flow training with a cylinder in a constant flow that generated downstream vortices, flowing in opposite directions. These vortices would travel from left to right in the simulated flow field. In order for the navigation logic to traverse this vortical flow, they randomly selected start and end locations on different sides.

The AI model they trained and used for inferencing was a combination of reinforcement learning (with an interesting multi-factor reward signal) and a policy using a trained deep neural network. They called this approach Deep RL.

For reinforcement learning, they used a reward signal that was a function of three variables: the time it took, the difference in distance to target and a success bonus if the probe reached the target. The time variable was a penalty and was the duration of the swim activity. Distance to target was how much the euclidean distance between the current probe location and the target location had changed over time. The bonus was only applied when the probe was in close proximity to the target location, The researchers indicated the reward signal could be used to optimize for other values such as energy to complete the trip, surface area traversed, wear and tear on propellers, etc.

For the reinforcement learning state information, they supplied the probe and the target relative location [Difference(Probe x,y, Target x,y)], And whatever sensor data being tested (e.g., for the velocity sensor equipped probe, the local velocity of the water at the probe’s location).

They trained the DNN policy using the state information (probe start and end location, local velocity/vorticity sensor data) to predict the swim angle used to navigate to the target. The DNN policy used 2 internal layers with 64 nodes each.

They benchmarked the Deep RL solution with local velocity sensing against a number of different approaches. One naive approach that always swam in the direction of the target, one flow blind approach that had no sensors but used feedback from it’s location changes to train with, one vorticity sensor approach which sensed the vorticity of the local water flow, and one complete knowledge approach (not shown above) that had information on the actual flow at every location in the 2D simulation

It turned out that of the first four (naive, flow-blind, vorticity sensor and velocity sensor) the velocity sensor configured robot had the highest success rate (“near 100%”).

That simulated probe was then measured against the complete flow knowledge version. The complete knowledge version had faster trip speeds, but only 18-39% faster (on the examples shown in the paper). However, the knowledge required to implement this algorithm would not be feasible in a real ocean probe.

More to be done

They tried the probes Deep RL navigation algorithm on a different simulated flow configuration, a double gyre flow field (sort of like 2 circular flows side by side but going in the opposite directions).

The previously trained (on cylinder vortical flow) Deep RL navigation algorithm only had a ~4% success rate with the double gyre flow. However, after training the Deep RL navigation algorithm on the double gyre flow, it was able to achieve a 87% success rate.

So with sufficient re-training it appears that the simulated probe’s navigation Deep RL could handle different types of 2D water flow.

The next question is how well their Deep RL can handle real 3D water flows, such as idal flows, up-down swells, long term currents, surface wind-wave effects, etc. It’s probable that any navigation for real world flows would need to have a multitude of Deep RL trained algorithms to handle each and every flow encountered in real oceans.

However, the fact that training and inferencing could be done on the same small hardware indicates that the Deep RL could possibly be deployed in any flow, let it train on the local flow conditions until success is reached and then let it loose, until it starts failing again. Training each time would take a lot of propulsive power but may be suitable for some probes.

The researchers have 3D printed a submersible with a Teensy microcontroller and an Arduino controller board with propellers surrounding it to be able to swim in any 3D direction. They have also constructed a water tank for use for in real life testing of their Deep RL navigation algorithms.

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BEHAVIOR, an in-home robot, benchmark

Posted on by Ray in Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, R&D measures, Robots, Scenario planning, Strategic Inflection Points, System effectiveness

As my readers probably already know, I’m a long time benchmark geek. So when I recently read an article out of Stanford (AI Experts Establish the “North Star” for Domestic Robotics Field) where a research team there developed a new robotic benchmark, I was interested. The new robotics benchmark is called BEHAVIOR which was documented in an ARXIV.org article (see: BEHAVIOR: Benchmark for Everyday Household Activities in Virtual, Interactive, and ecOlogical enviRonments). It essentially uses real world data to identify domestic work activities that any robot would need to perform in a home.

The problems with robot benchmarks

The problem with benchmarks are multi-faceted:

  • How realistic are the workloads used to evaluate the systems being measured?
  • How accurate are the metrics used to rank and judge benchmark submissions?
  • How costly/complex is it to run a benchmark?
  • How are submissions audited and are they reproducible?.
  • Where are benchmark results reported and are they public?

And of course robotics brings in it’s own issues that makes benchmarking more difficult:

  • What sensors does the robot have to understand how to complete tasks?
  • What manipulators does the robot have to perform the tasks required of it?
  • Do the robots move in the environment and if so, how do the robots move?
  • Does the robot perform the task in the real world on in a simulated environment.

And of course, when using a simulated environment, how realistic is it.

BEHAVIOR with iGibson (see below) seem to answer many of these concerns for an in home robot benchmarking.

What is BEHAVIOR?

First, BEHAVIOR’s home making tasks were selected from an American Time Use Survey maintained by the USA Bureau of Labor Statistics which identifies tasks Americans perform in their homes. With BEHAVIOR 1.0 there are 100 tasks ranging from building a fruit basket to cleaning a toilet, and just about everything in between. I didn’t see any cooking or mixing drinks tasks but maybe those will be added.

Second, BEHAVIOR uses a predicate logic, called BDDL (BEHAVIOR Domain Definition Language) to define initial conditions for tasks such as tables, chairs, books, etc located in the room, where objects need to be placed, and successful completion goals or what task completion should look like.

BEHAVIOR uses 15 different rooms or scenes in their benchmark, such as a kitchen, garage, study, etc. Each of the 100 tasks are performed in a specific room.

BEHAVIOR incorporates 1217 different objects in 391 categories. Once initial conditions are defined for a task, BEHAVIOR essentially randomly selects different object for the task and randomly locates them throughout the room.

In order to run the benchmark, one could conceivably create a real room, with all the objects and have them placed according to BEHAVIOR BDDL’s randomly assigned locations with a robot physically present in the room and have it perform the assigned task OR one could use a simulation engine and have the robot run the task in the simulation environment, with simulated room, objects and robot.

It appears as if BEHAVIOR could operate in any robotics simulation environment but has been currently implemented in Stanford’s open source robotics simulation engine called iGibson 2.0 (see: iGibson 2.0: Object-Centric Simulation for Robot Learning of Everyday Household Tasks and iGibson 2.0 website). iGibson uses the Bullet real time physics engine for realistic physical environment simulation.

A robot operating within iGibson is provided a 3D rendering of the room and objects in images or LIDAR sensor scans. It can then identify the objects that it needs to manipulate to perform the tasks. One can define the robot simulated sensors and manipulators in iGibnot 2.0 and it’s written in Python, is open source (GitHub Repo) and can be installed to run on (Ubuntu 16.04) Linux, Windows (10) or Mac (10.15) systems.

Finally, BEHAVIOR uses a set of metrics to determine how well a robot has performed its assigned task. Their first metric is success score defined as the fraction of goal conditions satisfied by the robot performing the task. Such as the number of dishes properly cleaned and placed in the drying rack divided by the total number of dishes for a “washing dishes” task. And their second metric is a set of efficiency metrics, like time to complete a task, sum total of object distance moved during the task, how well objects are arranged at task completion (is the toilet seat down…), etc.

Another feature of iGibson 2.0 is that it offers the ability to record a human (in VR) doing a task in its simulated environment. So if your robotic system is able to learn by example, then iGibson could be used to provide training data for an activity.

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A couple of additions to the BEHAVIOR benchmark/iGibson simulation environment that I would like to see:

  • There ought to be a way to construct a house/apartment where multiple rooms are arranged in a hierarchy, i.e., rooms associated with floors with connections using hallways, doors, stairs, etc. between them. This way one could conceivably have a define a set of homes/apartments (let’s say 5) that a robot would perform its tasks in.
  • They need a task list to drive robot activities. Assume that there’s some amount of time let’s say 8-12 hours that a robot is active and construct a series of tasks that need to be accomplished during that period.
  • Robots should be placed in the rooms/apartments/homes at random with random orientation and then they would have to navigate through rooms/passageways to the rooms to perform the tasks.
  • They need to add pet/human avatars in the rooms throughout a home. These would represent real time obstacles to task completion/navigation as well as add more tasks associated with caring for pets/humans.
  • They need the ability to add non-home rooms that could encompass factory floors, emergency response debris fields, grocery stores, etc. and their own unique set of tasks for each of these so that it could be used as a benchmark for more than just domestic robots.

Aside from the above additions to BEHAVIOR/iGibson 2.0, there’s the question of the organization that manages the benchmark and submissions. There needs to be a website/place to publish benchmark results for a robot AND a mechanism to audit results for accuracy to insure fair play.

Typically this would be associated with an organization responsible for publishing and auditing submissions as well as guide further development of BEHAVIOR/iGibson 2.0. BEHAVIOR 1.0 is not the end but it’s a great start at providing realistic tasks that any domestic robot would need to perform. 

Benchmarks have always aided the development and assessment of new technologies. Having a in home robot benchmark like BEHAVIOR makes getting domestic robots that do what we want them to do a more likely possibility someday.

There’s a new benchmark in town and it signals the dawning of the domestic robot age.

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